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Abstract 
This study examines the flexibility with which children can use pragmatic information to 
determine word reference. Extensive previous research shows that children choose an 
unfamiliar object as referent of a novel name: the disambiguation effect. We added a 
pragmatic cue indirectly indicating a familiar object as intended referent. In three 
experiments, preschool children’s ability to take this cue into account was specifically 
associated with false belief understanding and the ability to produce familiar alternative 
names (e.g., rabbit, animal) for a given referent. The association was predicted by the 
hypothesis that all three tasks require an understanding of perspective (linguistic or mental). 
The findings indicate that perspectival understanding is required to take into account indirect 
pragmatic information to suspend the disambiguation effect. Implications for lexical 
principles and socio-pragmatic theories of word learning are discussed. 
Keywords: word learning, mutual exclusivity bias, disambiguation effect, theory of 
mind, metacognition 
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Metacognitive developments in word learning:  
Mutual Exclusivity and theory of mind 
A frequent observation, both in word learning research and in everyday life, is that 
young children appear to assume that each object kind has only one name. This tendency can 
be demonstrated experimentally using what is known as the disambiguation paradigm (e.g., 
Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Merriman & Bowman, 1989). In the presence of a familiar 
nameable object and an unfamiliar object children are asked to pick the referent of a novel 
name. For example, when shown a familiar apple, and an unfamiliar whisk, and asked to pick 
the “hinkle”, children typically choose the novel object. This disambiguation effect is very 
robust and has been extensively used in research. It can be demonstrated from late infancy 
(e.g., Halberda, 2003; Markman, Wasow, & Hansen, 2003). It also constitutes a test case for 
differing theories about the nature of word learning, and about the relationship between word 
learning and metacognitive development. Determining the underlying cause of 
disambiguation is of broad theoretical importance. 
There are three general explanations of the phenomenon. (Others have proposed 
combinations of these explanations or hybrid accounts, e.g., Hollich, Hirsh-Pasek, & 
Golinkoff, 2000a, but we focus on these three for brevity.) The phenomenon is frequently 
identified as the ‘Mutual Exclusivity bias’ (e.g., Markman, 1989; Merriman & Bowman, 
1989), based on the idea that children assume word extensions to be mutually exclusive. 
Other lexical principles accounts have been proposed in which children prefer to map novel 
names to nameless categories (N3C; Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994) or vice versa 
(bias to fill lexical gaps, Merriman & Bowman, 1989). Unlike the Mutual Exclusivity bias, 
neither account predicts difficulty mapping novel names to nameable categories if other 
options are not apparent. 
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According to these accounts, the bias exists to aid word learning. It has frequently 
been noted (e.g., Quine, 1960) that the number of possible meanings of an unknown word is 
indefinitely high, but children nevertheless readily learn nouns. One possible way of 
narrowing down the number of plausible meanings is to assume that a novel word cannot 
refer to objects one can already name. For basic level categories, this assumption is typically 
true, and thus could be a useful initial approximation. Later in development, as children 
encounter more superordinate, subordinate, and otherwise overlapping terms, the bias is 
assumed to be relaxed, possibly on a case-by-case basis (Markman, 1989, p. 215). 
The main competitor to this view is the sociopragmatic account, according to which 
lexical principles are unnecessary. Instead, children are able to infer word meanings by 
judging others’ communicative intentions (Bloom, 2000; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; 
Tomasello, 2000) and other theory of mind judgements (Diesendruck, 2005; Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001). To do this, children employ two connected pragmatic principles proposed 
by Clark (1988, p. 319), the principles of conventionality and of contrast: “For certain 
meanings, there is a conventional form that speakers expect to be used in the language 
community, that is, if one does not use the conventional form that might have been expected, 
it is because one has some other, contrasting meaning in mind”. Thus, in the Disambiguation 
task, children infer that, had the experimenter wanted to refer to the familiar object, she 
would have used the familiar name. Since she did not, she must have some other meaning in 
mind, and the novel object is the most straightforward possibility. 
In support of the sociopragmatic claim, Diesendruck and Markson (2001) have shown 
that a disambiguation effect occurs not only with novel labels, but also with idiosyncratic 
facts about objects. Children were shown two novel objects and told a fact about one of them, 
for example “my uncle gave this to me”. They were then asked for “the one my cat likes to 
play with”. Most 3- to 4-year-old children chose the previously unmentioned object. If the 
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same bias occurs with multiple labels and multiple facts then it cannot be a specifically 
lexical bias. As Diesendruck and Markson (2001, p. 639) caution though, it remains to be 
shown that it is the same bias: lexical constraints could underlie disambiguation with labels, 
and pragmatic constraints disambiguation with facts. Consistent with this possibility, a 
comparison of fact and label version of the Disambiguation task with the same participants 
found no correlation, both with typical and participants with autism (de Marchena, Eigsti, 
Worek, Ono, & Snedeker, 2011). Scofield and Behrend (2007) examined the two versions 
developmentally and found that 2-year-olds showed the disambiguation effect for labels 
(81%) but not for facts (19%), whereas performance on the two versions was equivalent by 4 
years old. 
A third account differs from the other two in that it sees the disambiguation 
phenomenon as a result of a cognitive limitation, rather than a word learning strategy or 
sophisticated sensitivity to speaker intention. This may seem counterintuitive, since choosing 
the novel object as referent for a novel word is typically the best guess, and adults usually do 
this. However, adults can also hypothesise that the novel word may be an alternative label for 
the familiar object. There are good reasons to think that younger children cannot do this. 
Doherty and Perner (1998) showed children objects for which they knew two familiar names, 
such as truck and lorry, as demonstrated by a vocabulary test. Nevertheless, when presented 
with one of the names, children were not able to provide the other (the ‘Alternative Naming 
task’). This could not be explained by word-finding difficulties; children had equivalent 
difficulties when simply asked to judge whether another person was correctly playing the 
alternative naming game. 
The ability to apply alternative names to an object is claimed to be part of general 
metacognitive development at preschool age. Doherty and Perner (1998) showed that 
children’s difficulties with alternative names were comparable to and highly associated with 
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their performance on the False Belief task. This task requires children to predict where a 
character with a false belief about the location of an object will search for it.  
Doherty and Perner (1998) argued that both the False Belief and Alternative Naming 
tasks require children to make a distinction between the object or situation and how it is 
thought or talked about. This distinction can be characterized in terms of perspective (Perner, 
Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). The False Belief task requires children to distinguish 
between their own perspective on the situation and that of the protagonist, who falsely 
believes the object is where she left it. Regarding the Alternative Naming task, 
psycholinguists point out that the use of alternative labels puts different perspectives on a 
referent (Clark, 1987; Tomasello, 1999). Flexibly switching between alternative labels 
therefore involves the ability to distinguish between different perspectives. 
Perner et al. (2002) distinguish between switching, and coordinating or confronting 
perspectives. Clearly children can take different perspectives at different times, thus 
switching. This can be externally induced. Most straightforward, moving to a new location 
alters one’s visual perspective. Verbal perspective switches can be induced by other speakers 
using an alternative name. Plausibly children do this without noticing that a different name 
has been used. However, in order to deliberately to switch perspective, one must be aware 
that one is doing so. This requires understanding that there are perspectives, and that 
perspective differences are therefore possible. This is the ability that is taken to be 
demonstrated by the False Belief or Alternative Naming tasks. 
Thus, it appears children have difficulties simultaneously applying two words to one 
object. Doherty and Perner’s (1998) findings concerned words children had already learned. 
However, the theory makes no principled distinction between two known words and one 
known and one novel word. Equivalent difficulties when one of the words is novel would 
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produce the disambiguation effect: if children were unable to apply a second, novel word to 
the familiar object, the only remaining possible referent would be the novel object. 
Children become able to pass the Alternative Naming task around the age they pass 
standard False Belief tasks. This does not mean that children should stop showing the 
disambiguation effect at this age. As noted, in the standard version of the task, the novel 
object is the appropriate choice, so that even when children become capable of applying the 
novel word to the familiar object, they will not do so in this situation. What should occur is 
an increase in flexibility. Children should be able to apply a novel word to a familiar object if 
pragmatic factors indicate it is appropriate. We test this claim in the current study.  
Disambiguation versus other cues 
Jaswal and Hansen (2006) addressed whether children could avoid the disambiguation 
effect when other cues suggested the familiar object. The experimenter used a novel name 
while pointing to the familiar object. Children continued to pick the novel object. Grassmann 
and Tomasello (2010) argued that a static pointing gesture was not sufficient for children to 
realise it was a communicative act towards them. They showed that when the experimenter 
pointed and additionally alternated gaze from the child to the familiar object, 2- to 4-year-old 
children then overwhelmingly chose the familiar object. Jaswal (2010) found comparable 
results. In neither study were there developmental effects. 
These findings show that when an adult provides clear direct cues that the reference of 
a novel name is a familiar object children will be guided by these. Such cues are presumably 
very important for correcting mislearning of names and overextensions. Failure to account for 
their use would be a weakness for any theory. Although Grassmann and Tomasello accounted 
for performance in terms of socio-pragmatic understanding, both the lexical principles and 
perspectival accounts can also explain these findings. Children can relax the bias in specific 
cases given strong evidence it does not apply (Markman, 1989, p. 215). An adult giving clear 
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ostensive cues about the referent of a novel word is clearly strong evidence (so long as the 
adult is viewed as reliable). In terms of the perspectival account, children’s own perspective 
on an object can be externally switched by another speaker using an alternative name, 
without requiring the child’s control or reflective awareness (Perner et al., 2002). 
What is needed is a task where the three theoretical accounts yield different 
predictions. Haryu (1991; Haryu & Imai, 1999) developed a task that does so. The task 
assesses children’s ability to coordinate two indirect linguistic cues in a Disambiguation task. 
Haryu presented half of a sample of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old Japanese children with a standard 
disambiguation paradigm (e.g., presented them with an apple and a lipstick holder and asked 
to give puppet a heku, a novel Japanese word). The other half was additionally given a strong 
pragmatic cue indicating that the intended referent was the familiar object: “Mary is hungry. I 
would like to give Mary (the) heku”. The standard disambiguation condition replicated 
previous findings. All age groups selected the unfamiliar objects as referents for the novel 
terms. The second condition (Pragmatic Cue task) presented a very different picture, a clear 
developmental shift in object choice: 3-year-olds continued to pick the novel object and 
disregard the pragmatic cue; 5-year-olds selected the familiar object as referent for the novel 
word and thus no longer demonstrated a mutual exclusivity bias.  
The task involves two cues: 1) the novel word implies that the referent is not the 
familiar object; and 2) the clear implication that the referent should be something edible. In 
this situation the cues suggest different referents. The lexical principles account does not 
predict Haryu’s findings, but could explain them post hoc: the developmental change in 
selection of the familiar object in the Pragmatic Cue task could reflect a greater reliance on 
pragmatic information. Supporters of the account acknowledge that children use numerous 
cues to determine word meaning, and that the ME bias is gradually relaxed over time. The 
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shift from novel to familiar referent choice simply reflects a shift in the reliance of different 
strategies. 
From the sociopragmatic point of view, the task involves two pragmatic cues that 
suggest different referents. However, according to the sociopragmatic account, the cues 
should successfully work together. The account assumes that children have no difficulty 
accepting that two labels apply to the same referent if it is clearly indicated that this is what 
the speaker intends. The additional cue constitutes a clear indication. For the account to be 
able to explain Haryu’s findings would require auxiliary assumptions, for example that the 
additional cue is not well understood by younger children, or that coordinating the two cues is 
too taxing on children’s executive functioning. 
According to Perner et al.’s (2002) perspectival account, the developmental shift 
shown by Haryu results from children developing an understanding of perspective. Prior to 
this, children cannot conceive of objects having more than one label, and are therefore unable 
to choose the familiar object for the novel label, despite the strong pragmatic cue that this is 
appropriate.  
The perspectival account makes a further prediction not made by the other two 
accounts. Success on the Pragmatic Cue task should coincide with success on other tasks 
measuring the developing understanding of perspective. Neither of the other accounts 
naturally predicts this; possible ways of modifying them to account for it are considered in 
the Discussion. The aim of the present study is to test this prediction. We do so by comparing 
performance on the Pragmatic Cue task with the tests of conceptual and linguistic perspective 
taking used by Perner et al. (2002) and Doherty and Perner (1998), the False Belief and 
Alternative Naming tasks. The hypothesis is that performances on these tasks will be strongly 
associated, over and above age and verbal mental age. 
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Experiment 1 
Haryu’s procedure and the one developed below assume that children would readily 
provide the appropriate object when simply told the doll is hungry and asked to give her one 
of the two objects, without the additional factor of a novel name. Although intuitively very 
plausible, we first verify this. 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 20 children (6 girls) from a predominantly middle-class nursery in 
central Scotland. There were 9 children below 3&1/2-years-old (M = 37 months, SD = 2 m, 
range 33 – 41 m), and 11 children above 3&1/2-years-old (M = 50 months, SD = 4 m, range 
44 – 55 m). All children in the present study took part in only one experiment.  
Design. 
Each child was administered the Pragmatic Cue-Only task and the False Belief task in 
counterbalanced order. 
Procedure and Materials. 
Pragmatic Cue-Only task. 
The child was introduced to Puppet (a bear glove puppet), then presented with a 
familiar object (e.g., a banana) and an unfamiliar object (e.g., a bottle stopper). Children were 
told: “Puppet is hungry and would like one of these. Please give Puppet one.” Four 
additional trials paired novel objects with familiar objects that would satisfy the puppet’s 
implied need (sleepy, cold, thirsty, bored). Presentation of objects was left/right randomised. 
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Table 1 
Pragmatic cues, familiar and novel objects for Experiment 1and 2a, and novel words for 
Experiment 2a. 
Pragmatic cue Familiar object Novel object Novel word 
hungry Banana Bottle stopper Hinkel 
sleepy Bed Bracket Flinder 
cold Jumper Drill slack adjuster Budit 
thirsty Juice Hose connector Jintoff 
bored Book Bicycle trouser clip Lozee 
(Disambiguation condition in Experiment 2a used the same materials) 
False Belief task. 
The following story was acted out with two Playmobile® figures, a box, a jar and a 
marble: 
“Now look, this is Sally and this is Tom. They have a box and a jar. Sally has a green 
marble. Sally puts her marble in the box and then she goes away. Now, Tom picks up Sally’s 
marble from the box and puts it in the jar. Then Tom goes away. Look, Sally is coming back.” 
Each child was asked three questions in order: 
Belief question: Where will Sally look first for her marble? 
Reality question: Where is the marble really? 
Memory question: Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? 
Children had to answer all three questions correctly to pass the task. 
Results 
The familiar object was selected as referent in 93% of trials. Two children selected 
the familiar object 3 out of 5 times, three children 4 out of 5 times (Table 2). The remaining 
15 children picked the familiar object on every trial. Performance was significantly above 
chance: t = 14.333, df = 19, p < .001, d = 6.58. Younger children selected correctly on 94% of 
trials, and older children on 93% of trials, a non-significant difference. 
The False Belief task was passed by 2 younger children and 6 older children (overall 
40%). The association between the performance on the Cue-Only task and the False Belief 
task was not significant (r = .281, p = .230). 
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Table 2  
Task performance for Experiment 1, 2a, 2b and 3 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2a Experiment 2b Experiment 3 
Condition 
Cue only 
 
n = 20 
Standard 
DT  
n = 43 
Pragm. 
Cue 
n = 45 
PC  
cue + word 
n = 21 
PC  
word + cue 
n = 23 
Standard 
DT  
n = 28 
Pragm. 
Cue 
n = 28 
Age a 43 43 45 47 47 48 
BPVS stand.score a  97 97 102 94  
False Belief b 40% 49% 53% 43% 43% 46% 
Disambiguation c 93% 88% 68% 60% 54% 94% 52% 
Alternative Naming c  28% 43% 45% 40% 39% 
Day-Night-Stroop c    66% 60%  
a mean. b percentage passing. c percentage correct. 
Discussion 
Preschool children have little difficulty selecting the pragmatically appropriate object 
when cued with a need state. This provides the baseline for the following experiments, which 
examine children’s behaviour when the request also includes a novel name. We compare this 
with performance on the False Belief and Alternative Naming tasks in order to test the 
prediction that success on the Pragmatic Cue task indicates an understanding of perspective. 
We also include a standard Disambiguation task of the same general format as the Pragmatic 
Cue task. It is predicted that performance on this task will approach ceiling, as typical in the 
literature (Haryu, 1991; Markman & Wachtel, 1988). In this and subsequent experiments we 
continue to employ a single False Belief task in view of the number of other measures and the 
young age of participants. As these measures include the theoretically relevant Alternative 
Naming task, which in previous research has been closely associated with performance on the 
False Belief task, we do not consider this a serious limitation. 
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Experiment 2a 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 88 children (44 girls) from four predominantly middle-class 
nurseries in central Scotland: 43 children took the standard Disambiguation task, 21 children 
in the younger group (M = 37 months, SD = 3 m, range 31 – 42 m) and 22 children in the 
older group (M = 48 months, SD = 4 m, range 43 – 59 m); 45 children took the Pragmatic 
Cue task, 20 children in the younger group (M = 39 months, SD = 3 m, range 34 - 42) and 25 
in the older group (M = 50 months, SD = 5 m, range 43 – 60 m). Assignment to either was 
randomised. Children’s verbal mental age was measured by the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale II (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) and did not differ between groups 
(Disambiguation group: M = 41 months, SD = 7 m, range = 29 – 59 m; Pragmatic Cue group: 
M = 44 months, SD = 12 m, range 20 – 84 m; t (86) = 1.25, p = .215, d = 0.27). 
Design. 
A False Belief task, the Alternative Naming task (after Perner et al., 2002), and either 
the Disambiguation task or the Pragmatic Cue task were administered over two sessions in 
randomized order. The BPVS II was administered last. 
Procedure and Materials. 
Disambiguation task and Pragmatic Cue task. 
The child was introduced to Jimmy the puppet, then presented with a familiar object 
(e.g., a banana) and an unfamiliar object (e.g., a bottle stopper). Children were asked to 
choose the referent of a novel word through pointing or picking up an object. Each of five 
trials presented a new set of one familiar and one unfamiliar object, and a novel word. The 
Pragmatic Cue task also used a different state of need for each trial (hungry, sleepy, cold, 
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thirsty, bored). Presentation of objects was left/right randomised. The wording of the request 
differed according to condition: 
Disambiguation condition:  
“Jimmy would like a hinkle, please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
Pragmatic Cue condition:  
“Jimmy is hungry and would like a hinkle, please give Jimmy a hinkle.”  
The objects, novel words, and pragmatic cues are listed in the order presented in 
Table 1. 
False Belief task. 
The False Belief task was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Alternative Naming task. 
Vocabulary check. 
Four sheets of paper (21 x 29.7 cm) were presented individually, each displaying six 
pictures. Children had to point to each experimental item twice on different sheets, once 
under the basic label (e.g., “Show me the cat”) and once under the superordinate label 
(“Show me the animal”). The correct item was pointed out on the rare occasion that the child 
refused to make a choice or pointed incorrectly. 
Alternative Naming phase. 
Children were presented with an individual picture and told: 
“Now, here are some more pictures. Each picture has two names. I am going to tell you one 
name for it and you can then tell me another name for it. Let’s try that. This is fruit. What 
else is it?” If the child did not respond, encouragement was given. “We can also call it an 
apple.”  
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After this practice trial, the procedure continued with four pictures (cat, food, owl, 
drink), then a second time using the alternative label (animal, burger, bird, milk). Children 
had to provide both superordinate and basic labels to pass a particular item.  
Results 
Disambiguation and Pragmatic Cue task. 
Figure 1 shows the number of times children chose the familiar item. For the 
Disambiguation task, most children chose the unfamiliar object on every trial (M = 4.4/5, SD 
= .90); the most frequent response for the Pragmatic Cue task was to choose the familiar 
object on every trial (M = 3.4/5, SD = 1.6), and there was a highly significant difference 
between mean performances on each task: t (86) = 9.87, p < .001, d = 2.13.  
 
Figure 1. Performance on Disambiguation and Pragmatic Cue task. 
Age effects 
For the Disambiguation group, both age groups performed above chance (younger 
group: t (20) = 16.41, p < .001, d = 7.34; older group: t (21) = 26.14, p < .001, d = 11.41). For 
the Pragmatic Cue group, younger children performed at chance, choosing the familiar item 
on 57% of trials, t (19) = .892, p = .384, d = 0.41. Older children performed significantly 
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above chance, choosing the familiar item on 75% of trials, t (24) = 4.43, p < .001, d = 1.81 
(Figure 2). The age improvement approached significance, t (43) = 1.92, p = .061, d = 0.59. 
 
Figure 2. Performance on novel word tasks by age (novel object chosen in DT, 
familiar object chosen in PC task) 
False Belief task. 
Roughly half the children passed the False Belief task in each group: Disambiguation 
group 49%, Pragmatic Cue group 53%, U (86) = 894.50, Z = -0.67, p = .500. Younger 
children (29% pass) performed significantly less well than older children (70%), U (86) = 
513.50, Z = -4.17, p < .001. 
Alternative Naming task. 
Twenty-one percent of responses were unanticipated but deemed valid, such as 
“sandwich” instead of “burger” and “pussycat” instead of “cat”. The analysis leniently scored 
a particular item as correct if children gave different acceptable responses on the two trials. A 
separate analysis using strict criteria produced the same overall pattern of results. 
Mean performance on the vocabulary check was 7.4 out of 8 items (SD = 0.70), 
indicating that failures on the ANT were not due to lack of relevant vocabulary. In the 
experimental phase, children named a mean of 1.35 (SD = 1.48) pairs correctly. Younger 
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children performed less well than older children, (16% correct vs. 50% pairs correct; t (86) = 
4.76, p < .001, d = 1.03). 
Comparison of tasks. 
Associations between task performances were examined separately for the 
Disambiguation and Pragmatic Cue groups. Performance on the Disambiguation task 
approached ceiling (M = 4.40/5, SD = .90) and was not significantly associated with other 
variables. Age and verbal mental age correlated strongly with performances on the False 
Belief and the Alternative Naming task for this group (Table 3). The correlation between 
False Belief and Alternative Naming performances remained stable after the influences of age 
and verbal mental age were accounted for. 
Table 3  
Correlations between tasks for Disambiguation group (correlation after partialling out age 
and verbal mental age (BPVS)) 
 BPVS False Belief Alternative Naming Disambiguation 
Age .53*** .62*** .43** .26 
BPVS  .56*** .40** -.05 
False Belief   .63*** (.47**) .09 (-.02) 
Alternative Naming    -.03 (-.11) 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 4  
Correlations between tasks for Pragmatic Cue group (correlation after partialling out age 
and verbal mental age (BPVS)) 
 BPVS False Belief Alternative Naming Pragmatic Cue 
Age .75*** .46*** .55*** .41** 
BPVS  .54*** .60*** .52*** 
False Belief   .68*** (.52***) .65*** (.51***) 
Alternative Naming    .68*** (.53***) 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Correlations between age, verbal mental age, and performances on the False Belief 
and Alternative Naming tasks were similar between the Disambiguation and Pragmatic Cue 
groups. Performance on the Pragmatic Cue task was significantly correlated with 
performances on the ANT and False Belief task (Table 4) and remained substantial and 
significant after age and VMA were partialled out. 
Figure 3 shows selection of familiar objects in the Pragmatic Cue group by False 
Belief performance. Children who failed the False Belief task selected markedly fewer 
familiar objects than those who passed, rising from below chance to close to ceiling: FBFail: 
45% vs FBpass: 87%; t (43) = 5.61, p < .001, d = 1.71. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Pragmatic Cue and False Belief performance 
Discussion 
As is typical, in the Disambiguation task, children chose the novel object on the vast 
majority of trials. There were no apparent relationships with the metarepresentational tasks. 
By contrast, performance on the Pragmatic Cue task was strongly related to performance on 
both the False Belief and Alternative Naming tasks, beyond common relationships with age 
and verbal mental age. Children who passed the False Belief task scored significantly higher 
on the Alternative Naming and also the new the Pragmatic Cue task. This supports the 
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hypothesis that children cannot override the tendency to assign novel labels to novel objects 
until they develop an understanding of perspective. 
A methodological concern was that in the Pragmatic Cue task the cue (e.g., “Jimmy is 
hungry…”) was always stated before the novel word (“… and would like a hinkle”). More 
impulsive children might have chosen a referent based on the cue, without attending to the 
following word, producing false positives. On the other hand, children might only attend to 
the novel word as this was the last piece of information. Recency effects might therefore 
influence the data and produce false negatives. 
A further experiment was therefore conducted with the order of mention of the cue 
and novel word reversed for half of participants. Additionally, a test of executive inhibition 
(Day&Night-Stroop, after Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994) was added to address the 
possible influence of inhibitory difficulties on object selection. Successful use of the 
pragmatic cue plausibly involves inhibiting a tendency to apply novel names to unfamiliar 
objects. Preschool children are known to be developing inhibitory abilities (e.g., Jones, 
Rothbart, & Posner, 2003). This development has also been hypothesised as critical to False 
Belief performance; a number of studies have found relationships between the two, although 
lack of a close relationship is also not uncommon (see Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010, for a 
review). The Alternative Naming task also plausibly requires children to inhibit the name the 
experimenter provides in order to produce the alternative. Thus inhibitory difficulties may be 
a common factor between the experimental tasks.  
Experiment 2b 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 44 children from three predominantly middle-class nurseries in 
central Scotland. Twenty one children (9 girls; M = 47 months, SD = 6 m, range 35 – 57 m) 
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heard the pragmatic cue followed by the novel word as in Experiment 2a; 23 children (11 
girls; M = 47 m, SD = 6 m, range 40 – 59 m) heard the novel word followed by the pragmatic 
cue.  
Design. 
The design was as for Experiment 2a, with the addition of the Day-Night Stroop task 
included either in the first or second session, counterbalanced. Children’s verbal mental age 
was measured by the BPVS 3 (Dunn, Dunn, Sewell, & Styles, 2009). 
Procedure and Materials. 
Pragmatic Cue task. 
There were two versions of the instructions: 
Cue + novel word:  
“Jimmy is very hungry and would really like a hinkle. Every time when he is hungry he likes 
a hinkle. Please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
Novel word + cue:  
“Jimmy would really like a hinkle, because he is very hungry. He always likes a hinkle when 
he is hungry. Please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2a, with one minor change. Pictures of 
familiar and unfamiliar objects were used instead of real objects (Table 5) to avoid 
distractions caused by children manipulating the objects. Use of pictures is common in word-
learning research (e.g., Axelsson & Horst, 2014; Diesendruck, 2005, Experiment 1; Plunkett, 
Hu, & Cohen, 2008). 
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Table 5 
Novel words, pragmatic cues and pictures for Pragmatic Cue task, Experiment 2 
Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar picture Novel picture 
Hinkel hungry 
  
Flinder sleepy 
  
Budit cold 
  
Jintoff thirsty 
  
Lozee sore a 
  
a Pragmatic cue “sore” was included to replace “bored” in Experiment 1 and 2a, which elicited unwanted responses like children offer to 
play with the puppet if he is bored. 
False Belief task. 
The False Belief task was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Alternative Naming task. 
To avoid unanticipated responses, cat/animal and burger/food were replaced by 
dog/animal and vegetable/carrot. Otherwise the procedure was as before. 
Day-Night Stroop. 
The child was presented with coloured sun pictures and black and white moon 
pictures, and told to respond to the sun card by saying “night” and to the moon card by saying 
“day.” After a brief training phase, children were presented one at a time with eight sun and 
eight moon cards randomly mixed. The correct responses for each set were compared, 
following a previously used procedure (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). 
Results 
Children in the cue + novel word condition chose the familiar object on 3.0 out of 5 
trials (SD = 1.3) compared to 2.7 out of 5 trials for children in the novel word + cue condition 
(SD = 1.2). This difference was not significant: t (42) = .687, p = .496, d = 0.11. The two 
groups performed virtually the same on all other tasks (all ps >.582) and were therefore 
combined for the analysis below.  
Age effects 
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The combined sample was split into a 3-year-old (N = 22, M = 41 m, SD = 3 m, range 
35 – 45 m) and 4-year-old group (N = 22, M = 52 m, SD = 3 m, range 48 – 59 m). 
Performance on the Pragmatic Cue task did not differ significantly between the groups (t (42) 
= .239, p = .813, d = 0.07), and performance of each group overall did not differ from chance 
(3-year-olds: t (21) = 1.27, p = .220, d = 0.55; 4-year-olds: t (21) = 1.43, p = .167, d = 0.62). 
False belief task. 
Of the whole sample of 44, 19 children passed the False Belief task. The improvement 
with age was modest: M3 = .20, M4 = .25; U (42) = 184.500, Z = -1.51, p = .130. 
Alternative naming task. 
Children recognised a mean of 7.5 out of 8 items correctly in the vocabulary check 
(SD = 0.79). In the experimental phase children correctly named a mean of 1.68 pairs (SD = 
1.50). 4-year-olds produced significantly more word pairs (M3 = 1.18, M4 = 2.18; t (42) = 
2.31, p = .026, d = 0.71). 
Day&Night Stroop. 
Children gave a mean of 10.0 (SD = 5.7) out of 16 correct responses; 28 children 
scored more than 50% correct, 8 of whom scored 100%. The 4-year-olds gave significantly 
more correct responses (M3 = 8.23, M4 = 11.82; t (42) = 2.19, p = .034, d = 0.68). 
Comparison of tasks. 
Correlations between the Pragmatic Cue, False Belief and Alternative Naming tasks 
were similar to the previous experiment, remaining substantial and significant after partialling 
out age, verbal mental age, and Day-Night Stroop performance (Table 6). 
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Table 6 
Correlations between tasks (correlation after partialling out age, BPVS and Day-Night Stroop 
(DNS)) 
 BPVS False Belief Alternative Naming Pragmatic Cue DNS 
Age .59*** .32* .46** .07 .35* 
BPVS   .51*** .46** .35* .38** 
False Belief   .56*** (.43**) .52*** (.44**) .16 
Alternative Naming    .40** (.35*) .15 
Pragmatic Cue     .09 
*p ˂ .05. **p ˂ .01. ***p < .001. 
Figure 4 presents the number of familiar objects selected in the Pragmatic Cue task according 
to False Belief performance. Again, children’s performance on the Pragmatic Cue task is 
strongly related to performance on the False Belief task (FB-fail: 46% vs FB-pass: 72%; t 
(42) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 1.17). 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Pragmatic Cue and False Belief performance 
Discussion 
Experiment 2b replicates the findings of Experiment 2a of a strong specific relation 
between performances on the Pragmatic Cue task and on the False Belief and Alternative 
Naming tasks. The order in which the pragmatic cue and the novel word were presented had 
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no discernible influence on performance. This suggests that impulsivity does not account for 
the findings.  
There was also no apparent relationship between performance on the Pragmatic Cue 
task and the Day-Night Stroop, a common test of preschool inhibitory ability. Performance 
on this task was related to age and verbal mental age, but not to False Belief performance. 
Although studies frequently find the two task performances are related, a lack of close 
relationship is not uncommon (Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010). 
Relationships between age and other variables in Experiment 2b were not as strong as 
in Experiment 2a. In particular, performance on the PC task was not related to age (although 
it was related to BPVS performance). Participants came from three different preschools, and 
it is plausible that this lead to a heterogenous sample of able younger children and more 
diverse older children. Our main aim has been to compare performance on the experimental 
tasks. This requires a range of performances, but age relationships were not critical to this 
endeavour (and indeed, were partialled out of the analysis). Nevertheless, age-related change 
in the Pragmatic Cue task is of interest. To further investigate this, we conducted a third 
experiment. To ensure a more homogenous sample we recruited from one single middle-class 
nursery. The nursery was in Salzburg, Austria simply because that was where both authors 
were at the time. Performance on the Alternative Naming task has been examined in English 
in England (Doherty & Perner, 1998) and Scotland (Doherty, 2000; current study E1, E2a, 
E2b), and in German in Austria (Perner et al., 2002) with comparable results. The first author 
is fluent in both languages and translated all tasks. An Austrian researcher fluent in English 
verified the accuracy of the translation.  
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Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. 
This study was performed with 28 children (18 girls) in two age groups from a local 
middle-class nursery in Salzburg (Austria): 3-year-old children ranged between 36 and 47 
months (N = 15, M = 42 months, SD = 4 m), 4-year-old children between 49 and 60 months 
(N = 13, M = 55 months, SD = 4 m).  
Design. 
Each child was seen individually in a small room next to the playroom. The tasks 
were randomly split over the course of two days and included amongst others (which we 
intend to report elsewhere) a False Belief task, the Alternative Naming task, Pragmatic Cue 
task and a Disambiguation task. 
Procedure and Materials. 
Disambiguation task & Pragmatic Cue task. 
The cues used for previous PC tasks were translated into German and German 
sounding novel words were chosen, which were adopted from Grassmann, Schulze and 
Tomasello (2015), see Table 7.  
Table 7 
Materials for Disambiguation and Pragmatic Cue task 
Disambiguation task Pragmatic Cue task 
Novel word Familiar picture Novel picture Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar picture Novel picture 
Kulde 
  
Nohle hungry 
  
Fende  
 
Tahne sleepy 
  
Albe 
  
Doffe cold 
  
Mehfe 
  
Nehbe thirsty 
 
 
Losse 
  
Puhne sore 
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The procedure was similar to Experiment 2b, but with another alteration to improve 
focus on the novel word:  
The child was presented with the two face-down pictures first and told in the 
Disambiguation task: “Puppet would like a Kulde. Do you know what that is? – There is a 
Kulde on one of the pictures.” In the Pragmatic Cue task the need-state was added: “Puppet is 
hungry and would like a Kulde.”. The pictures were then both turned over at the same time 
for the child to select the “Kulde”. This further alteration was introduced so that children 
were presented with the pragmatic cue and novel word before they could make a choice.  
False Belief task. 
The False Belief task was the same as before. 
Alternative Naming task. 
The carrot-vegetable pair was used as teaching item and water replaced milk in the 
drink-milk pairing. The procedure was as before. 
Results 
Children chose the familiar object as referent for the novel word on average 2.61 
times (SD = 1.81) in the Pragmatic Cue task, compared to 0.32 times (SD = 0.91) in the 
Disambiguation task, a highly significant difference: t (27) = 6.710, p < .001, d = 2.58.  
Age effects 
Performance did not differ between 3-year-old and 4-year-old children for the 
Disambiguation task: M3 = 4.93, SD = 0.26, M4  = 4.38, SD = 1.26, t (26) = 1.54, p = .147, d = 
.0.60. Both groups performed significantly above chance: t3 (14) = 36.50, p < .001, d = 19.51; 
t4 (12) = 5.39, p < .001, d = 3.11. Performance improved significantly with age for the 
Pragmatic Cue task: M3 = 1.67, SD = 1.35, M4 = 3.69, SD = 1.70, t (26) = 3.52, p = .002, d = 
1.38, (Figure 5). Older children performed significantly above chance: t4 (12) = 2.53, p = 
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.027, d = 1.46; younger children performed significantly below chance: t3 (14) = 2.40, p = 
.031, d = 1.28. 
 
Figure 5. Performance on novel word tasks by age (novel object for DT, familiar object for 
PC task) 
False Belief task. 
The False Belief task was passed by 13 children. The age improvement was not 
significant: M3 = .40, M4 = .54, U (26) = 81.00, Z = -.863, p = .388. 
Alternative Naming task. 
Children identified an average of 7.39/8 items (SD = .69) correctly in the vocabulary 
check. During the test phase, children produced an average of 1.57 pairs (SD = 1.23). The 3-
year-olds produced on average 0.93 (SD = 1.03) word pairs compared to 2.31 (SD = 1.03) 
produced by the 4-year-olds, a significant difference (t (26) = 3.51, p = .002, d = 1.38). 
Comparison of tasks. 
Performance on the False Belief task, the Alternative Naming task, the Pragmatic Cue 
and Disambiguation task were entered in a correlational analysis. 
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Table 8 
Correlation of tasks (correlations after partialling out age) 
 FB AN PC DT 
Age .49** .74*** .65*** .20 
False Belief   
.69***  
(.56**) 
.63***  
(.47*) 
.01  
(-.10) 
Alternative Naming   
.67***  
(.37‡) 
.13  
(-.03) 
Pragmatic Cue    
.26  
(.17) 
‡ p < .10, * p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
Children’s ability to produce familiar alternative labels and accept an unfamiliar label 
for an already named object correlated strongly with false belief understanding. Figure 6 
presents the number of familiar objects selected in the Pragmatic Cue task according to False 
Belief performance. Again, children who passed the False Belief task performed markedly 
better on the Pragmatic Cue task than those who failed (t (26) = 3.90, p = .001, d = 1.53). 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Pragmatic Cue and False Belief performance 
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 3 confirm those of Experiments 2a and 2b of a strong and 
specific association between the Pragmatic Cue task performance and understanding of false 
belief, and to a slightly lesser extent, the ability to produce alternative names for familiar 
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objects. It also provides clearer evidence of how performance relates to age. Younger 
children performed significantly below chance on the PC task, rising to significantly above 
chance in the older group. 
The below chance performance is interesting; it suggests systematic choice of the 
novel object. In Experiments 2a and 2b children who failed the False Belief task tended to 
pass 2 out of 5 trials on the PC task (compare Figures 3 and 4 with Figure 6). This is only 
slightly below the chance level of 2.5, consistent with children who cannot coordinate the 
pragmatic cue and alternative name largely choosing at random. Haryu’s (1991) original 
findings were also of below chance performance at 3 years, with children choosing the novel 
object almost as often as in the Disambiguation task. Japanese children have been found 
typically to pass False Belief tests somewhat later (Naito & Koyama, 2006; Wellman, Cross, 
& Watson, 2001), which is consistent with the transition period in Haryu’s sample occurring 
between 4- and 5-years. Whether similar systematic novel object choice would occur with 
younger British or Austrian children will require further research on a younger sample. 
General Discussion 
This study examined development of the ability to select a familiar object as referent 
for a novel label. The typical Disambiguation task requires children to determine which of a 
familiar and a novel object is the referent of a novel name. We compared this task with one in 
which an additional pragmatic cue is given indicating that the familiar object is the intended 
referent. The ability to use this pragmatic cue was strongly and specifically associated with 
the abilities to understand another’s false belief and to produce familiar alternative names for 
objects. The relationship between the latter two metacognitive abilities has previously been 
established, and has been attributed to the fact that both require a clear distinction between 
the object talked or thought about and how it is mentally or verbally represented (Doherty & 
Perner, 1998). Following Perner et al. (2002), we refer to this distinction in terms of requiring 
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a common understanding of perspective. This distinction also seems critical to success in the 
Pragmatic Cue task. Children need to be able to consider the novel word as a potential new 
label for the familiar target. The principle difference to the Alternative Naming task is that in 
the Pragmatic Cue task the alternative name is novel rather than familiar. Prior to these 
developments, children’s tendency to choose the novel object as referent of a novel label is 
remarkably strong. Even when told first that puppet Jimmy is hungry, and then asked to give 
Jimmy a hinkle, children still chose the clearly inedible novel object. 
As noted in the Introduction, the lexical principles and socio-pragmatic accounts 
would not predict the developmental shift from selecting the novel to selecting the familiar 
object, or the association of this shift with the False Belief and Alternative Naming tasks. 
However, both could do so if modified to incorporate the development of understanding of 
perspective. 
Fit with Lexical Principles accounts 
The Mutual Exclusivity bias is conceived of as one of a number of ways of 
determining word reference. Thus, it readily combines with other accounts, and thus could be 
modified to account for early lack of perspectival understanding. Its basic claim is that 
children assume word extensions do not overlap. Our argument here has been that the 
disambiguation effect initially occurs because children cannot conceive of two words 
referring to the same thing (since this would involve two distinct perspectives on it). To avoid 
this, children attach novel words to objects they do not have a name for. Thus early lack of 
perspectival understanding could lead to children treating word extensions as non-
overlapping, within a given conversation. This is consistent behaviourally with the ME bias 
account. Once children become able to reason about the relation between words and their 
referents they can effectively relax the bias in specific cases. 
METACOGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN WORD LEARNING 32 
 
Note that this theory purely concerns determining referents for words, not learning the 
words per se. Hence, the common objection to the existence of an ME bias, that children’s 
vocabularies contain numerous overlapping terms (e.g., Gathercole, 1989; Nelson, 1988) 
does not apply. The perspectival account only predicts problems identifying the referent of a 
novel word if children both already know a word for the object and if they are aware of this 
word at the time. That is, if children fail to notice that they know a word for the object, the 
theory does not predict difficulties. 
It is likely children typically are aware of the familiar word in situations like the 
Disambiguation task. Children as young as 18 months have been found to implicitly name 
visually fixated images (Mani & Plunkett, 2010). Interestingly, Grassmann et al. (2015) 
report that for disambiguation to occur the familiar object label must be in children’s 
productive vocabulary (which would be required for implicit naming), not simply in their 
receptive vocabulary. 
In sum, the perspectival account and the findings presented here are compatible with 
an extension of the lexical principles account. However, the bias is seen not as existing in 
order to aid word learning, rather from an inability to conceive of more than one perspective 
on a given object. Any word learning benefits may be a fortuitous consequence. This view of 
the bias can explain why children learn multiple words for objects (typically when they do 
not notice they are doing so) and is consistent with findings that the bias appears very early in 
language learning. 
Fit with the sociopragmatic account 
The present findings could also be explained within the sociopragmatic framework if 
it is allowed that children develop a more sophisticated understanding of meaning over the 
preschool period. As noted in the Introduction, the basic assumption of the sociopragmatic 
account is that children learn words using the principles of conventionality and of contrast 
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from the start of word learning (Bloom, 2000; Clark, 1997). In the typical Disambiguation 
task the speaker does not use the conventional form for the familiar object, and thus is 
assumed to have some contrasting meaning in mind. However, most meaning differences also 
involve differences in perspective: differences in denotation, dialect, or register, for example, 
when referring to the same object all constitute differences in perspective (Clark, 1990). 
Children without an understanding of perspective would not be able to reason about 
contrasting meanings of these kinds. However, differences in reference do not create 
perspective difficulties: because they involve different objects, they do not require the 
distinction between an object and how it is talked about. 
Thus development of perspectival understanding could therefore be incorporated into 
the pragmatic account by arguing that younger children have a restricted concept of meaning: 
they can only consider differences in meaning in terms of differences in referent. This would 
limit their ability to apply the principle of contrast, in a way that would explain the current 
findings. The only contrasting meanings children could consider would be contrasting 
referents, and thus would choose the novel object as referent for the novel word, regardless of 
the additional cue. It would also explain the association with the Alternative Naming task, 
which would also be difficult with this restricted concept of meaning.  
For older children, developing a more sophisticated understanding of meaning would 
principally entail understanding differences in perspective, i.e., that different words can be 
used to refer to the same thing (e.g., Clark, 1997; see Perner et al., 2002 for a discussion; 
Tomasello, 1999). Thus allowing for developmental change in children’s understanding of 
contrast in this way would result in an account very similar to the one we propose, and would 
imply specific limitations on children’s ability to use speaker intentions to infer word 
meanings. 
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Alternative ways of incorporating pragmatic factors into word learning 
It is not our intention to deny that pragmatic principles are important in word learning. 
However, they do not need to be explicitly represented or involved in sophisticated reasoning 
(see Hollich, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2000b, for a hybrid account on early word learning). 
In younger children, the disambiguation effect plausibly results from the incorporation of 
basic pragmatic principles into the automatic procedures for determining reference. The 
intuitions behind the sociopragmatic account are clearly valid and descriptive of the way 
speakers typically behave: adults rarely refer to familiar objects with novel names, and in a 
given conversation speakers rapidly adopt a consistent set of terms for the referents (Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2010). However, conformity to these norms 
may not require computationally-demanding consideration of speakers’ referential intentions 
(which arguably, would limit children’s ability to determine reference in on-line interactions). 
In most cases, an automatic tendency to resist second names for objects in a given 
conversation would achieve the same result. Exceptions like those in the Pragmatic Cue task 
are unusual, and if children have limited cognitive resources, the possibility of meeting cases 
like these can be ignored as a reasonable trade-off. Increasing metacognitive sophistication 
would lead children to understand why this automatic tendency is sensible. It would also 
allow them to behave otherwise in cases like that posed by the Pragmatic Cue task. 
Conclusion 
In the current study we compared performance on a modified version of the 
Disambiguation task, the Pragmatic Cue task, with performance on the False Belief and 
Alternative Naming tasks, success on which indicates an understanding of perspective. When 
a request clearly implies the familiar object but uses a novel name, children’s ability correctly 
to select the familiar object is strongly associated with their performance on other tests of 
perspectival understanding. From this we conclude that young children’s success on the 
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typical Disambiguation task is not the result of sophisticated reasoning about speaker 
intention, nor the operation of a specifically lexical principle. Instead we argue it results from 
a failure to understand perspective, and thus an inability to conceive of two words applying to 
the same object in a given situation. Older children and adults are able to conceive of 
different words in terms of differences in perspective. This allows them to choose flexibly if 
other information implies the familiar object is the referent, as in the novel Pragmatic Cue 
task. 
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